

M1117 "Guardian" Armored Security Vehicle (ASV) Employment in Peace Operations

**A Monograph
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14. ABSTRACT

The U.S. Army Military Police (MP) Corps began fielding the M1117 "Guardian" Armored Security Vehicle (ASV) in Fiscal Year 2000, in order to provide MP with greater protection and firepower. Most MP officers have never employed the unique capabilities the new vehicle will bring to the modern battlefield. The ASV is the equivalent of a Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) and is well suited for wartime operations, and its presence on the battlefield will significantly improve the combat fighting capabilities of the MP. This paper focuses on ASV employment in peacekeeping (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO). The U.S. has been involved in many peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in the past, and will likely be involved in many more in the future. The characteristics of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations however, are very different from each other. This monograph asks the question: When is it best to employ the ASV as a visible presence or as a focused presence, in order to achieve endstate objectives of peace operations? Joint Publication 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, states that the peacekeepers main function is to establish a presence, which inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. What should that presence look like? Joint publications mention visible presence and overwhelming presence. Instead of overwhelming presence, this paper uses the concept of focused presence to dictate another method of employing the ASV. Visible presence is defined as an overt and continuous visibility of ASVs within the area of operations. Focused presence is defined as concentrating or massing ASVs at specific times and locations within the area of operations. Using the operational variables for peace operations of consent, degree of impartiality, and use of force; this monograph concludes that during peacekeeping operations, the best employment method is as a focused presence. Given the high level of consent, the need to maintain impartiality, and the minimum use of force required during peacekeeping, focused presence is the preferred ASV employment method. During peace enforcement operations, the preferred method is as a visible presence. The low level of consent, the low need to maintain impartiality, and the possibility of combat make visible presence the preferred method for employing the ASV.

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This paper focuses on ASV employment in peacekeeping (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO). The U.S. has been involved in many peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in the past, and will likely be involved in many more in the future. The characteristics of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations however, are very different from each other.

This monograph asks the question: When is it best to employ the ASV as a visible presence or as a focused presence, in order to achieve endstate objectives of peace operations? Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, states that the peacekeepers main function is to establish a presence, which inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. What should that presence look like? Joint publications mention visible presence and overwhelming presence. Instead of overwhelming presence, this paper uses the concept of focused presence to dictate another method of employing the ASV. Visible presence is defined as an overt and continuous visibility of ASVs within the area of operations. Focused presence is defined as concentrating or massing ASVs at specific times and locations within the area of operations.

Using the operational variables for peace operations of consent, degree of impartiality, and use of force; this monograph concludes that during peacekeeping operations, the best employment method is as a focused presence. Given the high level of consent, the need to maintain impartiality, and the minimum use of force required during peacekeeping, focused presence is the preferred ASV employment method. During peace enforcement operations, the preferred method is as a visible presence. The low level of consent, the low need to maintain impartiality, and the possibility of combat make visible presence the preferred method for employing the ASV.

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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Army Military Police (MP) Corps began fielding the M1117 "Guardian" Armored Security Vehicle (ASV) in Fiscal Year 2000, in order to provide Military Police with greater protection and firepower. Most Military Police officers have never employed the unique capabilities the new vehicle will bring to the modern battlefield. The addition of this vehicle requires that new doctrine be written. The MP school is scheduled to finish writing the Field Manual for this vehicle by November 2001.

The ASV is the equivalent of a Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) and is well suited for wartime operations. Its presence on the battlefield will significantly improve the combat fighting capabilities of the Military Police, but what will be the best way to employ it during peace operations?

Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, states that the peacekeepers main function is to establish a presence, which inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process.¹ What should that presence look like? Joint publications mention visible presence and overwhelming presence. Instead of overwhelming presence, this paper uses the concept of focused presence to dictate another method of employing the ASV. Visible presence is defined as an overt and continuous visibility of ASVs within the area of operations. Focused presence is defined as concentrating or massing ASVs at specific times and locations within the area of operations.

The purpose of this monograph is to answer the following question: When is it best to employ the ASV as a visible presence or as a focused presence, in order to achieve

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: 12 February 1999), II-2.

the endstate objectives of peace operations? Answering this question will be easier if the reader understands why the Military Police need the ASV, and also understand the peace operations environment and characteristics.

The Military Police have used the M8 Armored Car in World War II, the M20 Armored Car in the Korean War, and the V-100 "Commando" Armored Car in Vietnam. These vehicles conducted numerous critical convoy escort missions and patrols and were highly relied upon by the Military Police.² Budget constraints after Vietnam ceased the procurement of armored cars for the Military Police, but with the fielding of the ASV, a critical operational capability gap had been filled.³ Comparing the capabilities of the ASV versus the current M1114 Up Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (UAHMMWV) will provide a basis for discussion on ASV employment in peace operations.

The comparison of the UAHMMWV to the ASV shows the increased protection and lethality of the ASV, and answers the question of why the Military Police needs an ASV.

Support to diplomacy, peacekeeping (PKO), and peace enforcement (PEO) are operations under the peace operations umbrella. This paper focuses on ASV employment in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations that Military Police might participate. The characteristics of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations however, are very different from each other. These differences will change the employment techniques of the ASV to support the objectives of each operation.

² Maureen W. Cross, Major, "Armored Security Vehicle (ASV)," *Military Police* PB 19-96-1 (Summer 1996), 6.

³ Ibid.

Using Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*; Joint Publication 3-07.3; Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, this paper will define the doctrine for peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The different types of peace operations, the environment, and characteristics of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations will be examined. The differences between the two operations in terms of the operational variables of consent, impartiality, and force will be shown. How the commander understands each variable is important in determining the nature of the peace operation and force-tailoring mix.⁴ The principles of peace operations further define the environment that military forces will operate.⁵ Defining the characteristics of the peace operations environment provide the foundation for applying the variables and principles of peace operations.

This monograph also analyzes operations from the past by looking at U.S. operations in Vietnam, Somalia, and British Army operations in Northern Ireland. This chapter focuses on how ASVs were used, or possibly could have been used. The evaluation criteria are the operational variables consisting of the level of consent, the degree of impartiality maintained, and the use of force. Each operation is analyzed to determine whether the ASV was employed as a visible presence or a focused presence.

The concluding chapter elaborates on Military Police doctrine, and how Military Police support peace operations. Then using the MP doctrine, the operational variables, the differences of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, and the lessons learned from the historical analysis, it answers the research question.

⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Field Manual 100-23 *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 30 December 1994), 13.

CHAPTER 1

WHY DOES THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS NEED THE ASV?

The M1025/26 HMMWVs have been the workhorse of the Military Police corps since they replaced the M151 1/4 ton Jeep in 1986. In August 1993, a MP team was conducting a Main Supply Route (MSR) patrol in Mogadishu, when their vehicle struck an estimated 50 lb. command-detonated land mine.⁶ In October 1993, the lack of survivability shown by HMMWVs during the Task Force Ranger debacle proved again the need for a more survivable, wheeled weapons platform. In April 1991, immediately following Desert Storm, the Military Police School sent a Required Operational Capability (ROC) document to the CG, TRADOC requesting approval of the ASV. The ASV had been a priority for the Military Police Corps for a while, and the events in Somalia allowed the MP Corps to press its need upon the Army once more.

The M1114 Up Armored HMMWV

The Military Police determined it had an operational capability gap between the capabilities of the HMMWV and the M113 APC/M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV). The M113 and BFV have a much greater survivability and firepower capability than the HMMWV, but they are very heavy, maintenance intensive, and cost prohibitive. The HMMWV was able to be disabled by small caliber rounds and provided almost no protection to the crew. The increased lethality of the third world environment to include armor-piercing munitions, improved anti-armor systems, and mines forced the Military Police to look at light armor vehicles. Procuring the M113 or BFV was not feasible or

⁵ Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: 16 June 1997), I-10.

cost effective, so other vehicles would have to be evaluated. The first attempt to enhance



Figure 1

the survivability of MP teams was the UAHMMWV (Figure 1)⁷. The UAHMMWV began production in early 1995.⁸

The UAHMMWV is based on the latest Enhanced Capacity Vehicle (ECV)

version of the HMMWV and has a higher level of armor protection including protection against mines and 7.62mm armor-piercing rounds. It carries a crew of three with seating for another soldier. Other features include modified differentials; improved braking and suspension; 6.5 liter turbo-diesel engine developing 190 horsepower; upgraded wheels; and a central tire-pressure regulation system.⁹

The vehicle's armor provides protection for up to 7.62mm armor-piercing rounds for 360° around the vehicle. It provides airburst protection from 60mm rounds at thirty meters and 155mm rounds at sixty meters. It can also withstand a twelve pound anti-tank mine blast in the front underbody and four-pound mine blast in the rear underbody. Frontal protection is provided for the gunner up to 7.62mm rounds. Compared to the standard HMMWV version, this is a significant increase in protection, but it still has

⁶ Christopher W. Nelson, Captain, "Military Police Support to Operations Other than War in Somalia." *Military Police* PB 19-94-2 (August 1994), 25.

⁷ ASV Employment Course, Command and General Staff College, *PowerPoint Presentation: CGSC_TTP* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2000), 4.

⁸ Christopher F. Foss, ed., *Jane's Armour and Artillery 20th Edition* (Surrey, UK, 1999), 248.

⁹ Ibid.

limitations. The payload of the vehicle is reduced to 1300 pounds, down almost a 1000 pounds from the M1025 version.

The M1117 Armored Security Vehicle



Figure 2

In December 1995 the Military Police selected the Cadillac Gage ASV 150 to be the future ASV for the U.S. Army Military Police Corps. The M1117 Armored Security Vehicle (Figure 2)¹⁰ is a four-wheel drive vehicle. It consists of an all-welded steel armor hull that has been

fitted with advanced ceramic armor to provide the crew with a higher level of protection against heavy machine guns, armor-piercing rounds, conventional artillery splinters, land mines and the effects of rocket-propelled grenades. The ceramic armor is mounted to the steel hull with a spall liner on the interior surfaces.¹¹ The vehicle carries a crew of three with an optional seat for a fourth passenger.

Compared to the UAHMMWV, the vehicle has an independent axle coil spring suspension system, which will give it a significant increase in cross-country mobility. A central tire-pressure inflation system is included along with other measures to reduce noise and thermal signatures.¹² The vehicle provides protection from .50 caliber armor-piercing rounds to the crew compartments and ammo storage areas.¹³ It provides airburst

¹⁰ ASV Employment Course, 4.

¹¹ Foss, 519

¹² Ibid, 520.

¹³ Headquarters, U.S. Army Military Police School, *System Evaluation Report (SER) for the Armored Security Vehicle (ASV)* (Fort Leonard Wood, MO, 24 July 2000), 3.

protection from 60mm rounds at ten meters, and 155mm rounds at fifteen meters. Anti-tank mine protection is provided for up to twelve pound blasts at each wheel and four pounds in the center of the vehicle.

The vehicle mounts a fully enclosed Up Gunned Weapons Station (UGWS)




Figure 3

(Figure 3)¹⁴ and is also referred to as the 40/50 turret. This turret rotates 360° and allows for 45° elevation of the weapon systems. The weapons mounted in the turret consist of the Mark 19 (MK19) 40mm automatic grenade launcher, and the M2 .50 caliber machine gun. The M36E2 sight allows the gunner to engage targets at the MK19

maximum effective range of 2200 meters during day or night engagements. Turret improvements over the standard UGWS provide increased survivability and a reduced silhouette. Two banks of four electrically operated smoke grenade launchers are mounted on either side of the turret, firing forwards. The payload of the ASV is 3,360 pounds, which greatly increases the carrying capacity of the MP team as opposed to the UAHMMWV. The ASV possesses mobility comparable to the UAHMMWV, and is transportable by C-130 aircraft, rail, and marine transport modes.¹⁵

Comparison of UAHMMWV to ASV

The benefits of the ASV are much greater as compared to the UAHMMWV. In comparing the two vehicles, the ASV provides a much more intimidating presence than

¹⁴ ASV Employment Course, 7.

¹⁵ Foss, 519.

the UAHMMWV, but is not as intimidating as the M113/ BFV. The psychological advantages gained by having an ASV on the scene versus a UAHMMWV are significant, especially when having to conduct a combat or peace enforcement operation. While both crews are afforded protection when buttoned up, the gunner can still operate the weapon systems within the ASV. The UAHMMWV gunner leaves the weapon unmanned and subject to compromise. The increased ballistic protection of the ASV against 12.7mm rounds and twelve pound mines versus 7.62mm rounds and four pound mines for the UAHMMWV also enhances the survivability of the crew during operations.

Summary

In comparison, the greater firepower and survivability for ASV crews will increase the capabilities of MP units in higher intensity operations. The operational capability gap the ASV fills between the UAHMMWV and M113/ BFV gives the MP commander greater flexibility, but ASV employment during peace operations will be more challenging for the MP commander. In order to maximize the ASV's capabilities in peace operations, understanding peace operations doctrine and the peace operations environment are imperative.

CHAPTER 2

PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

Types of peace operations

The doctrinal manuals that define U.S. Army peace operations are Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)*, Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*; and U.S. Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*. Another reference is the *Joint Task Force commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*. Peace operations fall under the Military Operations Other Than War umbrella. There are various operations associated with MOOTW, but this discussion shall be limited to peace operations. Peace operations encompass three types of activities: support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.

The first type is support to diplomacy, which has become increasingly more important in recent years, but military action takes a back seat to diplomatic initiatives in this arena. Many of the military actions that support this peace operation are typical, day-to-day military missions.¹⁶ As stated earlier, this monograph will focus on peacekeeping and peace enforcement operational aspects.

The second type of peace operation is peacekeeping. Peacekeeping involves military operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties. These operations are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

¹⁶ FM 100-23, 3.

Peacekeeping activities include observation and monitoring of truces and cease-fires and supervision of truces.¹⁷

While observing and monitoring truces and cease-fires, military personnel may have to observe, monitor, verify, and report that parties to a dispute abide by the commitments they agreed to, such as truces and cease-fires. The forces may have to monitor a developing situation and report on events to the authorizing authority. During these types of operations, soldiers must remain impartial and responsible to the authorizing authority.¹⁸ These forces are generally armed with only their organic small arms. However, they may deploy with other larger weapons if the threat dictates.¹⁹

Peace enforcement is the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. The purpose of peace enforcement is to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.²⁰

Peace enforcement may include combat action. Transitioning to combat action means the unit must possess warfighting skills. Thus, in a theater of operations both combat and noncombat actions may occur simultaneously. Forces conducting peace enforcement may, for example, be involved in the forcible separation of belligerent parties or be engaged in combat with one or all parties to the conflict.²¹

¹⁷ Joint Publication 3-07.3, I-6.

¹⁸ FM 100-23, 4.

¹⁹ Ibid., 5.

²⁰ Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-7.

²¹ FM 100-23, 6.

There are three elements of peace enforcement operations. They are phases, forces, and missions. All peace enforcement operations have several phases. The first phase is a rapid deployment to establish a strong military presence in the area of operations. Subsequent phases will include the transition from a military presence to support for civil authority. The forces deployed normally include infantry, engineer, military police, and aviation units that are armed according to the commander's estimate and METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops available, Time available and Civilian considerations). The missions assigned to peace enforcement force include the restoration and maintenance of order and stability, protection of humanitarian assistance, guarantee and denial of movement, enforcement of sanctions, establishment and supervision of protected zones, forcible separation of belligerent parties, and other operations as determined by the authorizing body.²²

Peacekeeping vs. Peace enforcement

There is a clear difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Although both are peace operations, they are not part of a continuum. A distinct demarcation line separates these operations. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations take place under different circumstances that are characterized by the differences in three critical variables- consent, impartiality, and force (Figure 4).

VARIABLES	PEACEKEEPING	PEACE ENFORCEMENT
Consent	High	Low
Impartiality	High	Low
Force	Low (Self defense/defense of mandate)	High/Low Sufficient to compel/coerce

Figure 4

23

²² FM 100-23, 7.

²³ Ibid., 13.

Consent is evident where parties to the conflict, those that share responsibility for the strife, exhibit a desire to accomplish the goals of the operation. Consent, however, may shift during the course of a military operation.²⁴ In traditional peacekeeping operations, any decline in consent is of significant concern to the peace operation commander and may unfavorably influence the subsequent development of the campaign. Crossing the *consent divide* between peacekeeping and peace enforcement fundamentally changes the operation. Commanders should avoid hasty actions that unintentionally cause a degradation of the level and extent of consent.²⁵

Impartiality means that the peace operations force will treat all sides in a fair and even-handed manner, recognizing neither aggressor nor victim. This implies the force will carry out its tasks in a way that fosters the goals of the mandate rather than the goals of the parties. The central goal of peace enforcement is the achievement of the mandate, not maintenance of impartiality. Although desired, the peace enforcement force may not be able to attain this. The French currently use a method called *active impartiality* during peace enforcement operations where they focus on current behavior of the involved parties employing force because of what is being done, not because of whom is doing it.²⁶ Compromised impartiality may trigger an uncontrollable escalation from a peacekeeping to a peace enforcement situation by crossing the *consent divide*. In circumstances where

²⁴ Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-10.

²⁵ FM 100-23, 13.

²⁶ Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-10.

the required degree of impartiality is unclear, the commander must press the authorizing body for clarity since misunderstanding can be disastrous.²⁷

The use of force is not precluded in either type of peace operation. While traditional peacekeeping is generally nonviolent, peace enforcement may include very violent combat actions.²⁸ In peacekeeping the use of force is for self-defense. In peace enforcement operations, force is used to compel or coerce compliance with established rules.²⁹ Of the three variables, the level of force is usually the only one over which the commander can exert influence. Therefore commanders must be judicious in employing force.³⁰ Commanders must be aware of each variable and how each impacts on the mission and understand the importance of maintaining a proper balance of each in order to successfully accomplish the assigned mission.

Principles of Peace Operations

Peace operations are also guided by the six Principles of Peace Operations. In addition to these principles, the principles of war should be considered when planning operations that may include combat action. The Principles of Peace Operations are objective, unity of effort, security, perseverance, restraint, and legitimacy.³¹

The first principle, Objective, is defined the same for peace operations as it is for combat operations. All military operations will be directed towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The objective in these cases will be defined by the

²⁷ FM 100-23, 13.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-10.

³⁰ FM 100-23, 13.

³¹ Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-7.

resolution or mandate. Commanders must understand that political considerations will drive military operations and the refinement of the endstate is iterative.³²

The second principle, Unity of Effort, is also the same as the principle of war definition. Commanders should seek Unity of Effort toward every objective. In peace operations, the military may not be the lead agency. The commander should seek a coordination structure that incorporates activities of all elements in the area, whether it is nongovernmental, private or voluntary organization. Establishment of extensive liaison, communications, and cooperation is required to make the operations succeed.³³

Security, the third principle, is defined as never permitting a hostile faction to acquire an unexpected advantage. Force protection measures are generally associated with this principle. Security also enhances the legitimacy and impartiality of the force. Ensuring freedom of action throughout the joint area is important, and the type of operation may extend this protection to nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations.³⁴

The principle of Perseverance means preparing for measured and protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. In peace operations the military should prepare for long protracted operations. Developing a coherent information operations strategy is key and gauging social and political progress is critical to measuring success of the operation. A delicate balance exists between attaining objectives quickly and achieving strategic aims over the long term.

³² Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: 16 June 1997), I-10.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

Restraint is the appropriate application of military capability. This involves the disciplined application of force, tactics, and rules of engagement. These should be justified and carefully controlled, and the use of mediation and negotiation can diffuse a crisis and provide societal "face-saving" options for the commander to use to his advantage. This principle is closely related to the last principle, Legitimacy.

Legitimacy involves sustaining the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern, or a group or agency to make and carry out decisions. Using public affairs, civil affairs and psychological operations to enhance perceptions can greatly add to the legitimacy of the force and the host nation government. Impartiality is critical as is avoiding any action that inadvertently legitimizes one faction over another.³⁵

These principles are critical to mission success. They provide a peace operation force a set of guidelines from which to understand their environment and to ensure appropriate military force is applied given the situation or type of operation. The misapplication of these can undermine any success gained in a peace operation. Losing legitimacy, lackadaisical security, or not showing proper restraint can destroy confidence in a peace operation in the eyes of the belligerents. Not having a clearly defined objective can be the death of a peace operation. Without this, the force may wander away from what is important. The objective must be clear. These principles serve to remind the commander of what is important.

The Peace Operations Environment

Understanding the variables and principles is critical to peace operations but defining the environment they are applied in is the foundation. Peacekeeping and peace

³⁵ JTF Handbook for Peace Opns, I-10.

enforcement operations vary greatly in nature and scope, but the environments of these operations and activities share some common characteristics.

The first principle is the primacy of political objectives. In peace operations, political objectives drive military decisions at every level, from the strategic to tactical. Military personnel should understand that their actions could negatively affect the desired objectives of the mission. Adjustments to the mission may be needed, and must be linked to a changing political environment.³⁶

Peace operations often take place in situations that are complex, ambiguous, and uncertain. This makes military operations highly fluid and dynamic. The ability to react quickly to a changing environment is essential to mission success. Commanders must provide clear guidance, and ensure they get clarification to changing political objectives in order to ensure proper military support to these objectives.³⁷

The belligerents or parties to the dispute may or may not be professional armies or organized groups under a reliable chain of command. The belligerents may be groups of irregulars, crime syndicates, or other loosely organized hostile elements of the population. Under these circumstances, decisions by the recognized leaders may not bind the subordinate elements. The U.S. military commander may have to deal with multiple factions, all with their own agenda, and consider which is the best course of action to ensure a peaceful end. Weapons that a military peace operations force may encounter range from conventional munitions and mines to weapons of mass destruction. Some

³⁶ Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-12.

³⁷ Ibid.

belligerents may have modern weapon systems such as surface-to-air missiles and long range mortars.³⁸

Much closer civil-military cooperation and communication is required to ensure a thorough understanding of the endstate desired. The location of peace operations has historically been in austere or highly populated urban environments. Logistics is a major challenge when conducting these operations. Careful time phasing of the appropriate resources is critical to accomplishing the mission. The duration of peace operations is another planning factor that requires attention. Most peace operations are conducted on short notice, but usually will require a long-term commitment on the part of the peace force. Establishing criteria and conditions which define a successful end state in as timely a fashion as possible and directing efforts to that end state are important.³⁹

Developing the proper force structure and composition is critical to conducting a successful peace operation. Using all the various services' capabilities provides flexibility and mitigates risk to the mission. Relying solely on one service may hinder the force's flexibility. Force composition should be robust enough to respond to unanticipated situations that may arise. Force caps may be ordered on certain missions, but planners should avoid any force caps that may increase the risk to the force once it deploys. Unit integrity is key to success. Units that have trained together are more likely to be able to adjust to a highly fluid and dynamic environment than an ad hoc unit put together solely for the mission.⁴⁰

³⁸ Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-13.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., I-14.

Force Protection considerations are central to all aspects of peace operations planning and execution, particularly when the mission is a PEO or PKO that involves interposition between former belligerent forces. Even in relatively benign environments, force protection measures will be employed commensurate with the security risks to the force.⁴¹ Rules of Engagement (ROE) and weapons control policies are aspects of force protection, and having the right ROE is essential to mission success. The impartiality of the force is also another aspect of force protection that most do not think about. Ensuring the force remains impartial will lessen the tension of the belligerents and begin building the confidence of the belligerents in the peace operations force capabilities to maintain order. As confidence rises, the desire to take action against the force will lessen.

A final aspect of the peace operations environment is civil disturbances. PKO and PEO will most likely include civil disturbances. Mishandling a civil disturbance and letting it get out of control can potentially have a long lasting negative impact on the mission. Handling a disturbance well can lead to fewer instances in the future. Some ways to control civil disturbances are to isolate in time a space the trouble spot from outside influences. Using a system of checkpoints to limit access of instigators to the area can lessen tension at the site. Dominating a situation through presence and controlling information resources can lessen the desire of individuals to instigate a disturbance. Multi-dimensional actions can lessen the influence of the troublemakers. These actions may involve convincing media to cooperate with the peace force or using non-lethal

⁴¹ Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-14.

assets to quell a situation before it escalates.⁴² ASV use in these situations must be strictly controlled. The possibility of escalating the tension exists.

Summary

The differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations are distinct. The crossing of the *consent divide*, the degree of impartiality, and the use of force provide a clear demarcation line between the operations. The six principles of peace operations and the characteristics of the peace environment provide a foundation for understanding peace operations and to ensure that military force is applied prudently. It is critical to mission success for commanders to understand these variables, principles, and characteristics or the misapplication of military force might not meet the endstate objectives.

⁴² Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-20.

CHAPTER 3

THE ASV IN HISTORY

Beginning with the M8 "Greyhound" vehicle in World War II, many wheeled armored security vehicles have been used by the United States. The employment of armored cars in peace operations, by many countries throughout the world, has been varied and extensive. The ability of these vehicles to rapidly adapt to changing conditions and missions has been a bonus to countries that employ them. Understanding how these vehicles were used in past operations can provide a basis of comparison to discuss ASV employment as a visible or focused presence in the future.

The V-100 Armored Car in Vietnam

In Vietnam, the V-100 Commando armored car was employed by the United States against the communist forces of North Vietnam and Vietcong insurgents. Studying how the military police in Vietnam employed the V-100 will be beneficial to understanding the limitations and characteristics of wheeled armored vehicles in operations. Vietnam was a war, and as noted earlier, peace enforcement operations are akin to combat operations. MP doctrine states that MP support to units during peace enforcement operations should mirror the support given during combat.

The V-100 was an amphibious and multi-purpose combat vehicle designed to function as a personnel carrier, reconnaissance vehicle, convoy escort, or a patrol and riot control vehicle. The Commando provided protection against .30-Caliber rounds and with additional armor added to select locations, it could withstand .50-caliber rounds. The vehicles V-6 Diesel engine could achieve speeds of sixty miles per hour. This vehicle

was outfitted with the newly developed run flat tires in the 1960s. This greatly increased the mobility of the vehicle.⁴³

The small, fully enclosed, gun turret mounted a variety of weapons. It usually carried twin .30-caliber machine guns, but could also mount a 30/50-caliber machine gun combination, twin 7.62mm machine guns, or twin .223-caliber Stoner machine guns. This turret was also capable of mounting an automatic grenade launcher or water cannon for riot control. It was capable of mounting one 20mm cannon with a specially modified turret.⁴⁴

According to an armored car survey conducted in February 1974, personnel associated with the V-100 operations in Vietnam stated that forty-nine percent of the missions conducted by the V-100s were convoy security missions. Conducting road patrols and base defense tasks were conducted fifteen and thirteen percent respectively.⁴⁵ This high rate of convoy security missions is attributed to the idea that the V-100 was primarily designed as an armored convoy escort vehicle. It was not until four years later, that the V-100 was significantly employed in the other missions of road patrols and base defense.⁴⁶

The V-100s arrived in theater in July 1967. The 18th MP Brigade was allocated six V-100s in order to evaluate their capabilities and limitations. At the end of the evaluation in January 1968, the vehicle was accepted into the inventory and an additional

⁴³ James B. Carroll, Captain, "The Commando Armored Car." *Armor* (September-October 1965), 36.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁴⁵ Department of the Army, *Armored Car Survey Report* (Washington, DC, Feb 1974), 1.

⁴⁶ Department of the Army, *Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65* (Washington, DC, 26 May 1971), 3.

sixty-six vehicles were requested for the rest of the Brigade's units. After the introduction of a large number of these vehicles into the theater, a study was conducted on MP employment of the vehicles. The study recommended that twelve vehicles be assigned to each company.⁴⁷

Placing the V-100s in the convoy security role provided many advantages. The 500th Transportation Group operational report for the period ending 30 April 1969 states that "the mere presence of the V-100 increases morale of all convoy personnel by its armored appearance, and the quality of its weapon system. The armor protection and increased firepower of the twin thirty caliber machine guns make this vehicle far superior to an M-151"⁴⁸. The M-151 was the standard jeep with a pedestal-mounted machine gun mounted in the back.

The operational report stated that the V-100 was easier to maintain, traveled at the same speeds, and had better cross-country mobility than the M-151 jeep. The Transportation Group recommended that the V-100s be considered for use within the Group itself and used to escort all convoys within the Republic of Vietnam.⁴⁹

Change 1 to FM 19-4, Operational Employment of Armored Cars

On 8 September 1969, Change 1 to Field Manual 19-4 was issued. Some of the basic factors considered in the optimum employment of the V-100 when requirements exceeded assets included: (a) priority of the mission, (b) essentiality of using armored

⁴⁷ Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 504th MP Bn, 89th MP Gp, et al, 24.

⁴⁸ Department of the Army, *Operational Report- Lessons Learned, 500th Transportation Group, Period ending 30 April 1969* (Washington, DC, 5 September 1969), 3.

⁴⁹ 500th Transportation Group Operational Report, 4.

cars, (c) number of armored cars available, (d) vulnerability of the route, (e) type and volume of traffic, and (f) the availability of alternate routes.

The Field Manual change included discussions on support to tactical operations (offense and defense), convoy security and route reconnaissance, physical security, rear area protection, and special employment such as civil disturbances. The V-100 had utility in the attack as a base of fire platform to support a dismounted attack, or as a reaction force to block enemy counterattacks and reinforce other units in emergency situations.⁵⁰ In the defense it could provide excellent mobile patrols between checkpoints and roadblocks established in the rear area, and could also be used in pairs to cover withdrawals of units. They could be used as perimeter security if needed but were much more useful in a mobile role.⁵¹

In a physical security role, the armored cars could provide a psychological deterrent to enemy attempts to penetrate or take action against friendly facilities. Armored cars could be employed where a definite threat against a facility was expected. Primary employment of the armored cars would be in a mobile as opposed to a static role. This allowed the armored cars to provide a rapid response to any threat within the area of operations.⁵²

In civil disturbances, employing the V-100s was a sensitive issue. The V-100 presented a formidable appearance and its premature introduction in to the scene may have increased instead of lessened the tension in a situation. The vehicle also had a wide

⁵⁰ Department of the Army, Change 1 to Field Manual 19-4, *Military Police Support, Theater of Operations* (Washington, DC, 8 September 1969), 19-7.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., 19-10.

turning radius, and its employment in built up areas would have caused a significant problem if required to reverse direction. Employing multiple armored cars together in a "task force" was one method of using them to support civil disturbance operations. These task forces would be used against larger, hard-core resistance groups or mobs. In conjunction with dismounted troops it was very effective and provided some cover for dismounts if needed.⁵³

The V-100s in Vietnam performed superbly. Their design and capabilities greatly increased the effectiveness of the combat Military Police in theater. The V-100s provided much better security to units than the M151 Gun Jeep. The vehicle did provide a psychological boost in morale to the units it supported as noted in the 500th Transportation Group report. The more lethal firepower and survivability of the vehicle meant the difference between life and death to many soldiers. Convoys experienced a much lower ambush rate when the V-100 arrived in theater. As the ambush threat diminished, the V-100 was used for other missions as well. Their organization and allocation to the various units however, was under constant review by the 18th MP Brigade, and determining the best employment method of this limited resource was a constant problem.

Applying the operational variables to Vietnam shows that the consent divide was crossed, and there was a high degree of impartiality and high use of force. This is analogous to a peace enforcement operation for the purposes of this paper, since MP support Peace enforcement operations the same way they support combat operations.

⁵³ Change 1, FM 19-4, 19-11.

In Vietnam, the V-100s were initially given a very strict convoy escort mission, and employed as a focused presence. This was due to the high ambush rates of convoys by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army. The limited numbers of vehicles in theater also forced higher headquarters to strictly control the employment of the vehicles. As the situation and threat changed, the V-100s were employed as a visible presence and conducted more mobile patrols and base defense missions.

The Need for ASVs in Somalia

Somalia was classified as a peace enforcement operation, and the intent of the mission was to establish and enforce a secure and stable environment under which foodstuffs could be moved to starving people within the country. In order to do that, many engagements and situations occurred with some involving combat. On 3 December 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 794, approving the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."⁵⁴ The populace of Somalia had been starving for months during the earlier part of 1992, and the government structure had broken down. The power in Somalia was in the hands of a few warlords. The most notable being General Mohamed Farah Aideed, who was the leader of the Somali National Alliance. The deployment of troops, securing of airports and other transportation facilities, moving tons of material in support of the troops, and distributing vast quantities of relief food to remote villages and other famine locations prevented massive starvation and was clearly a major accomplishment of the international intervention.⁵⁵ From January to June 1993,

⁵⁴ Terence Lyons and Ahmed I Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Occasional Papers, 1995), 34.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 39.

people were fed while many conferences and negotiations were held to bring peace back to Somalia. On 5 June 1993, one event would irreversibly change the course of diplomacy. A group of Pakistani soldiers were ambushed and many were killed while conducting a routine inspection of a weapon cache belonging to Aideed. The UN and US officials determined it to be Aideed, and the hunt began.⁵⁶ In August, Special Operations Forces were requested to assist in finding Aideed, and these forces were in place by September 1993.

There was a significant anti armor threat in Somalia however. Many Somali militias had RPGs and heavy machine guns in their inventory. These would pose a difficult problem for the lighter US forces if a decisive engagement occurred. Just weeks before the fateful Task Force Ranger raid, DOD rejected a request by the task force for Abrams tanks and Bradley armored vehicles. It seems fairly obvious that a light infantry force trapped in a hostile city would be better off with armored vehicles to pull them out. Many of the men who fought in Mogadishu believe that at least some, if not all, of their friends would have survived the mission if the Clinton administration had been more concerned about force protection than maintaining the correct political posture.⁵⁷ The U.S. did not want the world to think this operation was anything but a humanitarian assistance operation.

In the after action review conducted by the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), it stated that MPs performed a wide range of missions in support of the

⁵⁶ Terence Lyons, 57.

⁵⁷ Mark Bowden, *Blackhawk Down, A Story of Modern War* (New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), 335.

operation. The ARFOR commander used the MPs as a combat multiplier in combat and combat support roles. The MPs flexibility and wide range of capabilities provided the commander with many options when facing a very elusive enemy.⁵⁸

The MPs in Somalia supported various infantry Task Forces on combat and combat support missions, conducted long haul convoy escorts, and provided reaction forces for base clusters. Operation Restore Hope proved to be a classic military police environment. The similarities between the rear battle operations that the MPs train for on a daily basis as well as the unique requirements of the peace operations environment showed the versatility of the military police. MPs understanding of restricted rules of engagement proved vital to showing restraint in a number of tense situations.⁵⁹

When discussing the mobility of infantry forces, the AAR concludes by stating that some additional firepower and mobility could be added to the infantry units with the addition of some wheeled light armored vehicles, such as the U.S. Marine Corps LAV. It says that not all units need these but some should be task organized to a unit for a specific mission or requirement and would prove valuable in this environment. The LAVs protection, firepower and psychological advantage would prove valuable to a light infantry force. As a force multiplier and complementary system to infantry forces, the LAVs would definitely assist infantry units in the same missions in the future.⁶⁰

It is obvious that the 10th Mountain Division would have welcomed a platoon or more of ASVs supporting them in their missions. All the benefits discussed in the AAR

⁵⁸ Combat Studies Institute, Case Studies in U.S. Peace Operations and Interventions Since World War II, CD ROM Version1, *Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) and Fort Drum, ARFOR After Action Report for Operation Restore Hope. Fort Drum, New York, 2 June 1993* (Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 1999), 58.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 59.

are the exact reasons the ASV will be a significant peace multiplier during peace enforcement operations. It also mentions the need to task organize these vehicles to support specific missions. Infantry missions requiring a higher combat capability would be well suited for the ASV.

ASVs would have been a welcome addition to the infantry units in Somalia. The vehicle's superior firepower and protection would have greatly enhanced the security of the units. By task organizing the units properly, they could have influenced specific operations when needed. Whether supporting infantry Task Forces, securing convoys, or providing a reaction force in Mogadishu, the ASVs would have done well.

The MPs ability to operate effectively under difficult circumstances will be of great value when the ASV is fielded. The restraint shown by MP in Somalia highlights their ability to operate within a peace operation environment. The MP commander on the ground must understand that the ASV's presence at a situation may heighten the tension. It is a combat vehicle and presents a formidable appearance and obstacle to overcome. In some circumstances, it may be better to use HMMWV mounted MPs instead of ASVs. This all returns back to the consent, use of force, and impartiality guidelines discussed earlier. In Somalia, the *consent divide* was crossed repeatedly by the various clans. Having the ASV available when the *consent divide* is crossed will be extremely valuable to a commander. In Somalia, employing the ASV as a visible presence to show U.S. determination and send a message not to interrupt our operations would probably have been the best employment concept.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 60.

The British LAV Experience

The British have used LAVs extensively in their military since World War II, and have a keen understanding of LAV capabilities. According to Colonel Michael Cullinen, a British Armor Officer, the LAV design emphasizes mobility with limited firepower and relatively little protection. It will not stop a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) or larger rounds. A LAV does have the advantage of added flexibility, which stems from the versatile nature of the vehicle and the excellent communications system that each vehicle possesses.⁶¹

LAVs have great mobility on primary and secondary roads and good endurance. A light armored force can take on a wide-ranging set of operations and achieve quick shifts in weight and direction of operations. They are useless when on the move however. The fire control system is not stabilized and engaging an enemy effectively while moving is near impossible.⁶²

Limited armor protection makes them sometimes vulnerable to antitank fires, mines and direct hits by artillery. LAVs give the crew some protection as noted earlier. In order to maximize this protection, LAVs must use terrain to cover its movement to offset its lightweight armor.

Conducting quick diversionary attacks against heliborne or parachute landings, bridgeheads, and other such targets are suitable missions for LAVs. If there is a lack of organic heavy armor in the force, it is almost inevitable that they will be called upon to

⁶¹ Michael E. Cullinen, Colonel, British Army, "Light Armour in Light Force Operations," *Military Digest* (May 2000), 22.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 23.

engage and defeat enemy armor forces. It is very risky to ask light armor to engage heavy armor, but under some circumstances and conditions, it may be possible.⁶³

Light armor forces can conduct a screen line if needed. If the proper sectors can be found, their sights can provide increased visibility over the area. The ability to rapidly move and engage enemy vehicles also is a bonus. If called upon to do so, the unit can act as a delaying force also.⁶⁴

Mobile patrols are a prime task. Route and area reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and joint mobile/foot patrols have been extremely useful employment for light armor in the past. They are very helpful to foot patrols which need additional reinforcement or firepower support. Escorts for VIPs or supply convoys have been the most prominent of all tasks. They provide excellent protection in these instances.

When involved in crowd control, the British have determined that it is advisable to keep LAVs away from the crowd. They can only be effective as a threat, much like that of a policeman on a horse, but can provide excellent roadblocks and communications when dealing with disturbances.⁶⁵ The ability to rapidly move to a location and establish a roadblock is extremely beneficial to the commander. LAVs can also remove roadblocks by crashing through them or using grappling hooks to remove them. Wheeled LAVs must be extremely careful when trying this. They may high center themselves and become part of the roadblock themselves. Barrier removal equipment must be installed on the vehicle before attempting this task. All British LAVs involved in crowd control operations are

⁶³ Cullinen, 24.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 25.

equipped with barrier removal equipment. Another good use for them is forming an outer cordon to ward off people from entering a location.

British Army operations in Northern Ireland

LAVs have been used for many years in support of British Army operations in Northern Ireland. Major Douglas M. Chalmers, of The Royal Irish Regiment, British Army, provided valuable assistance explaining British operations in that country. He was born in N. Ireland, and has served over four years there conducting a mix of rural and urban operations. He states that British Army operations in Northern Ireland are categorized as Military Aid to the Civil Power. The Army's mission is to support the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in maintaining law and order and combating terrorism through the conduct of operations to deter terrorist activity.⁶⁶

The British use numerous different types of LAVs to support their operations. The Snatch is a light armored Land Rover with a powerful engine. It looks very similar to a commercial Land Rover in shape and size, and is the most commonly used vehicle within the theater. It is also being used in Bosnia and Kosovo to support operations there. The APV is a heavier and better-protected version of the Snatch, that is used mainly in urban areas, specifically North Belfast, West Belfast, and Londonderry. These are the more heavily contested areas of N. Ireland. The Saxon is the squad vehicle that is used in British mechanized battalions. It is a box shaped vehicle with four wheels, and is capable of carrying four riflemen with equipment. It is capable of being fitted with a turret, but the versions in use in N. Ireland do not have a turret. All Saxons have a barricade bumper

⁶⁶ Douglas M. Chalmers, Major, The Royal Irish Regiment, British Army, interview by author, 16 November 2000, question sheet, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1.

for clearing obstacles if necessary.⁶⁷ Of note, all British LAVs have stone grills covering all windows and viewports in order to protect them from rocks and other thrown objects.

The British use their LAVs for patrolling, and as a Quick Reaction Force. During public order (civil disturbance) operations, the vehicles are used as a physical barrier and form an integral part of the British Army public order drills.

Just as with any LAV, these vehicles are not totally mine proof. They can withstand small mines, but some command-detonated mines of fifty pounds and up have been set off in N. Ireland in the past. Visibility is a problem unless sentries are posted in the top hatches of the vehicles for observation. Just as with mines, the vehicles will not protect the crew from large shaped charges, such as RPGs.⁶⁸

The British Army has developed a superb method of patrolling in N. Ireland that would easily support U.S. peace operations. The British call it "3D patrolling". It involves a mix of foot patrols, mobile patrols, and helicopter or camera-overwatch. The foot patrols conduct the local patrols, execute the primary tasks, and usually are the main effort during operations. The mobile patrols are usually not too far away and are the supporting effort. They can react quickly if more firepower or protection is needed for the foot patrols. The helicopter or cameras act as another supporting effort in the operation. All three elements of the technique do not need to be operational at once. For instance, mobile patrols may support a foot patrol during the first part of an operation, while

⁶⁷ Chalmers, 1.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 2.

helicopter or camera support may be employed later in the operation. Depending on the threat, all three may be utilized.⁶⁹

British operations in Northern Ireland are characterized by maintaining law and order, and combating terrorism. At any point in time, the consent divide may be crossed and the Army uses its LAVs to support foot patrols. The need to use force may occur at any time, and the British Army ensures that its LAVs are used in a visible presence to serve as a deterrent to rioting and terrorism.

Summary

ASVs have been used since World War II in various configurations and for various missions. The V-100 in Vietnam was used extensively by the MP to perform a wide range of missions and it performed as expected. Its introduction in the theater lowered ambush rates, which allowed them to be used for other missions. The flexibility the V-100 provided the MP commander greatly enhanced the combat fighting capability of the units.

In Somalia, the June 1993 10th Mountain AAR, and the October 1993 Task Force Ranger debacle, proved the need for ASVs by stating the need for a LAV to support operations within the country. The mission and the peace enforcement environment dictated the need for LAVs. The ASV would have been a welcome addition to the Task Forces on the ground by providing better security and protection. Employed as a visible presence, the ASVs would have provided a show of strength to the Somali people and possibly lessened the Somali's desire to act against UN forces.

⁶⁹ Chalmers, 3.

The British experience and methods of using their LAVs in N. Ireland are another example for U.S. military police to study and determine if any of the lessons learned by the British can be applicable to our operations. The 3D method of patrolling and the various configurations of their LAVs can serve to make us question our own methods and configurations for the ASV. The use of joint foot and mobile patrols, combined with another element such as helicopters or cameras, is a superb method of patrolling in an urban environment. This 3D method should be emulated within U.S. peace operations doctrine.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS

Military Police are extremely well suited to conduct peace operations. FM 3-19.1 states that military police core competencies are highly compatible with those required for peace operations. Military Police provide a highly trained and capable force that is more politically acceptable in peace operations than a combat arms force. The inherent characteristics of mobility, communications, self-protection capability and training allow Military Police to support peacekeeping operations fully. The Military Police also bring a significant combat capability if the situation dictates.⁷⁰ The signature of the military Police as a police force, rather than a combat force, often defuses tensions.⁷¹

The basic Military Police force structure for peace operations is situation dependent. The principle of consent affects the composition of the force. Most peace operations are characterized by limitations on the use of force. Military Police excel in this aspect, as they are experienced in applying varying degrees of force to de-escalate a situation before it becomes unstable, but understand when to apply more force if the situation dictates.⁷²

Military Police conduct many missions during peace operations which include route and area reconnaissance; operate mounted and dismounted patrols; operate LP/OPs; provide humanitarian assistance; investigate possible terrorist and criminal acts and cease fire and sanctions violations; and gather information. Military Police also disseminate

⁷⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army. U.S. Field Manual 3-19.1 *Military Police Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 18 Jun 2000), 11-2.

⁷¹ Joint Pub 3-07.3, II-5.

⁷² FM 3-19.1, 11-15.

information and provide crucial support to force protection. Crowd and riot control is another aspect of peace operations in which military police participate. Military police are an ideal force for controlling enraged mobs. Military police understand how to employ the varying levels of force to include lethal force if the situation requires it, and employing them early with a peace operation force can provide force protection for initial air/sea ports of embarkation and headquarters. Military Police participating in peace enforcement operations support these types of operations in the same ways they support combat operations.⁷³

Organizing the ASVs within the companies is a critical matter that must be discussed. During the Vietnam War, the lack of V-100 armored cars to support operations caused many problems for the military police, and the authorizations per company significantly hampered the proper employment of the vehicles. The problem was that twelve V-100s were authorized to each MP Company in theater. Experience showed that not all MP companies needed twelve vehicles. Some companies performed Law and Order missions primarily and did not have a great need for V-100s. MP companies that had a significant amount of tactical combat support and convoy escort missions needed considerably more V-100s than were authorized. This created problems for the MP units in Vietnam because it was very difficult to get V-100s transferred to the right places in theater. Flexibility in assigning the vehicles to missions and locations was needed. The 18th MP brigade recommended that one unit in theater should be authorized the vehicles,

⁷³ FM 3-19.1, 11-17.

and that unit could more easily allocate this limited resource within the theater to best serve the needs of the command.⁷⁴

This problem of how best to task organize the V-100s in Vietnam, leads to the issue of organizing ASVs within the MP companies today. The current structure authorizes one ASV per squad. This creates the same problems the 18th MP brigade faced in Vietnam with the V-100s. The Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) Report on MP Armored Cars states:

It was felt however, that a separate [V-100] platoon should be organized within the company in order to consolidate assets for more effective training, maintenance support, and employment. This implementation would preserve unity of command, continuity, and in recognition of some of the most significant problems observed by evaluators, develop and retain expertise.⁷⁵

Modern units will still have a limited resource along with potential requirements that exceed the unit's capacity to fill them, just as in Vietnam. The amount of high priority missions, especially given the reduced logistics footprint and importance of just in time logistics will make the ASV an important asset to a Corps and Division Commander. The need to secure supply convoys in theater will greatly increase. The MP companies will quickly find that requests for ASV support will increase. The ACTIV Report also stated that once the V-100s were introduced into the theater, it became a mission-essential vehicle, which resulted in a higher usage rate than expected. From its introduction into

⁷⁴ Department of the Army, *Operational Report- Lessons Learned, 504th MP Bn, 89th MP Gp, 16th MP Gp, 18th MP Bde, 720th MP Bn, 8th MP Gp, Period ending 30 April 71* (Washington, DC, 4 October 1971), 24.

⁷⁵ Department of the Army, Army Concept Team in Vietnam, *Final Report- XM706 Armored Car in Military Police Operations, ACTIV Project No. ACG-70F* (APO San Francisco 96384, 18 July 1970), VII-9.

theater in 1967, the most common organizational structure for the V-100s was as a platoon.⁷⁶

How the ASVs are currently organized within the companies could significantly influence the tactical and operational flexibility of the MP Corps. Granted, the Military Police are built around the MP team, but collective training as squads and platoons is critical to mission success. The piecemealing of ASVs within the company does not provide the requisite supervision over standardizing training and gunnery. Instead of assigning one ASV per squad, assign one ASV Squad per platoon (2 x light squads, 1 x heavy squad), or one ASV platoon per Company (3 x light platoons, 1 x heavy platoon). This provides less turmoil within the squad structure and more flexibility to the command. The squads would not be consistently split apart for the ASVs to work on other missions, and supervision of the ASV crews would be consistent.

Task organizing ASVs with HMMWVs for collective training and combat could be similar to the methods the U.S. Army Mechanized Infantry and Armor units train and fight. Individual through platoon training is conducted as a pure formation in these units, and then they task organize for collective training and combat at the company team level when needed. For example, if a mechanized platoon is assigned a mission as a tactical combat force, it can be allocated with little problem or confusion within the mechanized company structure.

Task organizing ASVs and HMMWVs in much the same way will provide much more tactical and operational flexibility to the MP commander to best achieve the higher commander's endstate objectives. Instead of tasking out ASVs from three squads to

⁷⁶ ACTIV Report, VII-12.

conduct a high-risk mission, it would be much easier to assign an ASV squad to the mission. The benefit is that the squad has consistent leadership and has trained collectively.

The Military Police have significantly increased the combat fighting capability of their soldiers. The ASV is a superb weapon system that offers increased firepower and protection for Military Police. The operational capability gap that the ASV fills between the Up-armored HMMWV and the M113/BFV will allow future MP commanders and higher level commanders to conduct full spectrum operations with more security and efficiency.

Understanding the peace operations environment is critical to properly employing the ASV in these operations. It is critical for the MP commander to understand the differences associated with consent, use of force, and impartiality involved with peace operations. Being on the lower end of the spectrum, peacekeeping presents a much different picture to the commander. The consent given in peacekeeping requires a minimal use of force and a high degree of impartiality by the unit. Peace Enforcement on the other hand has many different characteristics from peacekeeping. When the *consent divide* is crossed, the lack of consent on the part of the belligerents leads to more use of force and impartiality may not be maintained given the situation. Peace Enforcement operations may force or compel a party to comply with a mandate or agreement.

While the ASV will provide greater security to a force, the misapplication of the ASV could hamper the peace operation. Applying military capability prudently is critical in peace operations. Presenting too much force can hurt, instead of help a unit trying to conduct a peacekeeping operation. Since the ASV is designed as a combat vehicle, its

formidable appearance at a location during a peacekeeping operation could increase tensions between belligerents unnecessarily.

Just as the V-100 did in Vietnam, however, the ASV can have the same impact on units today. In a peace enforcement operation, the appearance of an ASV at a firefight can strengthen the resolve of those involved. Many of the V-100 operations in Vietnam could provide insight to ASV operations in the future. Military Police must not discount the past or be doomed to repeat the same mistakes. Somalia provided a prime example where the use of LAVs would have been a welcome addition to the force. The peace enforcement mission in Somalia was perfect for employing ASVs, had they been in the inventory. The fact that the 10th Mountain Division recommended the need to have them justifies the Military Police need for them also. British operations in Northern Ireland serve as another example of the use of LAVs to support MOOTW. The category of the British operations is different than peace operations, but similarities can be drawn from N. Ireland and applied to possible U.S. peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in the future.

In summary, crossing the *consent divide* is the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. In peacekeeping missions, it is better to employ the ASV as a focused presence in order to achieve endstate objectives. Since both parties consent to the operation, it is imperative to maintain a benign appearance. The ASV's appearance throughout the area of operations will not lend to impartiality or a benign appearance to the concerned parties. With a very formidable and lethal appearance, the ASV will not present a good picture to the two parties. Employing the ASV only at specific times and locations will show U.S. resolve to ensure certain events are not to be

disrupted. The two parties will come to understand that when the ASVs are present, it is not the time to interfere with the force. This also lends itself to showing restraint in that military capability is applied prudently, for only specific missions.

Once the *consent divide* is crossed however, and the mission becomes peace enforcement, employment of the ASV as a visible presence would be the better employment option in order to achieve endstate objectives. The constant visibility will show a formidable presence around the area of operation. By varying the patrol routes and locations of the ASVs, the belligerents will not know when or where the ASVs will appear. The increased firepower and protection will serve not only as a deterrent to the enemy, but as a psychological boost to U.S. forces in the area. This employment option provides greater security and quicker response times to the force, and since less restraint is appropriate in peace enforcement operations, it would not be violating the peace operation principle.

The addition of the ASV into the Military Police inventory provides a substantial increase in flexibility and capability for the MP commander. Its employment as a focused presence in peacekeeping and as a visible presence in peace enforcement operations will provide the best means of achieving a commander's endstate objectives in peace operations. This will further the identity of the Military Police Corps as the "Force of Choice".

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